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THE "LONG ARM" COMES TO MARYLAND
By BERNARD AUERBACH*
In 1964, Maryland joined the growing list of states having com-
prehensive "long arm" statutes which widen extensively the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over defendants.' The provisions of the statute
are based on Article I of the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act,2 which in turn was based on the prior enactments of
many other states, notably Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin. There
are few years that now go by without further additions to the roster
of "long arm" states.3
Involved in this movement is more than a change in local pro-
cedural rules. Since the adoption of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the permissible scope of state judicial jurisdiction
has been determined by the due process clause of that amendment.
As the meaning of due process developed to permit greater exercise of
jurisdiction by state courts, so did local procedural rules. In this area
of the law, state legislatures, by and large, willingly followed the
path first trod by the United States Supreme Court.
The direct impetus for the enactment of the various "long arm"
statutes was the Supreme Court's decision in the case of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,4 which contained a new formula for the
constitutional testing of state judicial jurisdiction. Although prior
Supreme Court decisions may have foreshadowed the result in that case,
the Court's opinion was a decided departure from the previous approach
to the problem and outlined the master plan for all subsequent local
enactments. The nature of the change in approach becomes apparent
even from a brief summary of the trend of decisions prior to as com-
pared to developments after International Shoe.
DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO International Shoe
The restrictions of early conceptualism and the use of legal fiction
and ingenious rationalization to escape those restrictions was the hall-
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The author wishes to express his appreciation to Frederick W. Invernizzi, Esquire,
Administrator of the Courts of Maryland, for his many helpful suggestions. He, of
course, bears no responsibility for any errors or half truths which managed to survive
his scrutiny nor for any of the views expressed.
1. Laws of Md., ch. 95 (1964). The relevant statutes can presently be found in
MD. CODE ANN. art. 75, §§ 94-100 (Supp. 1965).
2. The UNIFORM INTERSTATE & INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT [hereinafter cited
as UNIFORM ACT] was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in August, 1962, and was approved by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association in February, 1963. The act and the Commissioners'
Notes appear in 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 74 (Supp. 1964). Up to this time, in
addition to Maryland, the states of Arkansas, ARIK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-2501-2507
(Supp. 1965), and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2 (Supp. 1964) have adopted the
basic provisions of the UNIFORM ACT.
3. See notes 32-37 infra and accompanying text.
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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mark of the law of personal jurisdiction prior to International Shoe.
"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," stated Justice
Holmes in explaining the fundamental doctrine first established
in Pennoyer v. Neff,6 that due process requires service of process on
an individual defendant while present within the state for a valid
personal judgment. A corporation does not exist outside the borders
of the state of its origin, stated the Supreme Court in 1839.' It there-
fore followed that a personal judgment against a corporation could not
be entered outside the state of its incorporation. The only exception
to these rules was jurisdiction based on the consent of the parties.
These limitations on the jurisdictional authority of states could
not long withstand the increasing mobility in business and personal
affairs produced by modern civilization. The force that initially set
the process of expansion in motion was the tremendous growth of the
corporate form of business.
Since the assets and business of a corporation are often located
outside the state of incorporation, it became necessary to widen the
geographical area in which the corporation would be subject to the appli-
cation of judicial authority. At the beginning, the traditional basis of
consent was employed. As a condition for permission to do business
within a state, the corporation was required to appoint an agent to
receive process. Where the corporation did not appoint an agent,jurisdiction over its activities was justified in terms of an "implied
consent". As stated by the Supreme Court in 1856, "the corporation
must be taken to assent to the condition upon which alone such business
could be there transacted by them."' The theory of consent, however,
could not provide the basis for exercising judicial authority over
corporations engaged in interstate commerce which could not be ex-
cluded by any state.
It was principally Justice Brandeis who adapted the traditional
"presence" theory to corporations.' This held that a corporation, by
doing sufficient business within a state, becomes "present" there and is
thus amenable to its authority. Thus a corporation could be "present"
in many states at the same time. 10
5. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 443 (1839).
8. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 408 (1856). Thefictitious nature of the "implied consent" is described by Judge Learned Hand inSmolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148, 151 (S.D. N.Y. 1915).
9. A good example of such formulation is Bank of America v. Whitney Central
National Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923).
10. At this point, the Court had made a complete turnabout from the Bank ofAugusta case, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 443 (1839). The presence theory was criticized byJudge Learned Hand as doing no more than posing the question to be answered,
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930). The decisions were
not entirely consistent with the theory. Theoretically, if a corporation is present in a
state it should be subject to the jurisdiction of that state even on a foreign cause of
action. While there were some cases that did reach this result, most did not. See
note 24 infra. Also, in theory there should be no jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion that had withdrawn from the state, since it was no longer present there. This
was not the result reached in State of Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S.
361 (1933).
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This doctrine of jurisdiction was generally formulated as the
"doing business" theory. The Supreme Court soon found itself in-
vestigating the extent of the business done by a corporation within a
state in order to justify giving that state authority to decide contro-
versies arising within its confines. If it were found that the general
activity of the corporation in the state fell below the "doing business"
line or for some other reason the corporation was technically not doing
business in the state, the plaintiff was forced to pursue his remedy in
another state having no connection with the particular cause of action.
The standard of "doing business" was not met by a single or isolated
transaction." Even continuous activity by agents of the corporation
who solicited offers subject to acceptance by the company outside the
state was not "doing business".1" It was only solicitation plus some
additional activities, such as collection of money, which was held
sufficient to constitute "doing business"."
There was a parallel development in the doctrines of jurisdiction
over natural persons. Although many states had claimed the authority
to hear and decide claims against their own domiciliaries, it was not
until 1940 that the Supreme Court finally upheld such authority.' 4
The opinion of the court did not stray too far from the traditional
power concept of jurisdiction announcing that, "the authority of a
state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his
absence from the state. The state which accords him privileges and
affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile
may also exact reciprocal duties."15
For many years a state could not assert its judicial authority to
decide claims on the basis of activities of non-domiciliaries within the
territory of the state. It had been held that the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Constitution' 6 safeguards the right of citizens
of one state "to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits or otherwise,.....
Lacking the power to exclude, it was reasoned, a state lacked the power
to subject a non-domiciliary to its legal processes, unless he was
served with process while present in the state.1 8
Modern developments in transportation and communication forced
a change in legal theory. At first, it was the advent of the automobile.
Victims of injuries caused by non-resident motorists found themselves
forced by the old doctrines of jurisdiction to assert their claims in
11. See Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1028-
29 (1925).
12. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918) ; Green
v. Chicago, B.&Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). There were state court decisions that
held that continuous and substantial solicitation over a long period of time did con-
stitute "doing business". American Asphalt Roof Corp. v. Shankland, 205 Iowa 862, 219
N.W. 28 (1928) ; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
13. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
14. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
15. Id. at 463.
16. U.S. CoNsTr. art. IV, § 2.
17. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3,230) (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823).
18. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
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foreign forums, which had no connection with the events of the case,
where witnesses were not available and which might have to apply
foreign substantive law. In the famous case of Hess v. Pawloski,"9
involving a non-resident motorist, the Supreme Court upheld the
authority of the state where the automobile accident occurred to take
jurisdiction over the case. The Court based its decision on a modified
form of the "power to exclude". Since automobiles were dangerous
instruments, the state had "power to regulate" the use of its highways.
It could, therefore, require a non-resident formally to appoint an
agent to receive process before using its highways. The state, therefore,
has the "power to exclude" until this is done. Since the state has this
power, it can provide that the use of its highways is the equivalent of
such appointment.
Eight years later, in the case of Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,2"
the Supreme Court forgot about the "power to exclude" and referred
only to the "power to regulate". In that case, the claim was against a
foreign individual engaged in the business of selling corporate securi-
ties. The Supreme Court upheld the authority of a state to decide
controversies growing out of the business done there. This authority
was justified by the fact that the business of selling securities is sub-
ject to "special regulation" by the state.
DUE PROCEss AFTER International Shoe
It was in 1945 that the Supreme Court discarded the old shib-
boleths and adopted a more rational approach to the entire problem.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Stone which was to become a landmark
in the field of jurisdiction, new policies were set forth. The criteria to
determine the authority of a state, stated the Court, "cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative".2 It is sufficient if a defendant "have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice' ".2 The test is "the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws".2"
In this latter phrase, Justice Stone pointed out the basic objectives
inherent in a rational approach to the problem of jurisdiction. The
choice of forum must be "fair" so that the participants can satisfy their
legitimate needs in presenting their claims and "orderly" in allocating
competence among the various states in a manner which will protect
the legitimate interests of each state.
The International Shoe case dealt with a Delaware corporation
whose home office was in St. Louis, Missouri, and which maintained a
group of salesmen in the state of Washington. These salesmen took
orders from retailers which were accepted in the corporation's home
19. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
20. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
21. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
22. Id. at 316.
23. Id. at 319.
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office, the merchandise thereafter being shipped f.o.b. from St. Louis
to the purchasers in Washington. The corporation was sued by the
state of Washington for unpaid contributions to the state unemployment
compensation fund. Service of process was made on one of the sales-
men, who had not been authorized by his employer to receive process,
and by registered mail to the home office.
In essence, the Court's reasoning in upholding the jurisdiction of
the state of Washington over the International Shoe Company was that
it would be unfair to one who has a cause of action based on activities
within a state to be compelled to go outside the state to make his
claim. On the other hand, it would not be unfair to compel the foreign
corporation to defend the case in the state in view of its contacts there.
In addition, trial at the place of the events giving rise to the cause
of action would promote the interests of orderly judicial administration
in view of the location of the evidence there and the fact that its sub-
stantive law is applicable to the case.
Two problems other than the one directly involved in International
Shoe were also discussed in the Court's opinion. One was the question
of subjecting a foreign corporation to suit on a cause of action not
related to its activities in the state. On this problem, the Court merely
referred to past decisions. The Court stated that while there were
holdings that even continuous activity within the state is not enough
to subject the foreign corporation to that state's jurisdiction as to
suits unrelated to the activity,24 there had been other cases where "the
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so sub-
stantial and of such a nature" as to justify jurisdiction.25
Specific application of this analysis was made in Perkins v. Benguel
Consolidated Mining Co."' In that case, the defendant was a Philippine
corporation whose mining operations in the Philippines were halted
during the Japanese occupation. During this time, the president, who
was also the general manager of the corporation, returned to his
home in Ohio where he supervised the operations of the company,
maintaining there all office files, bank accounts, correspondence, etc.
The plaintiff sued in Ohio for accrued dividends and damages for
failure to deliver stock. The transactions were not related to any
events that took place in Ohio. Nonetheless, the Court held that the
corporation's activity in Ohio "was sufficiently substantial and of such
a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against
a foreign corporation where the cause of action arose from activities
entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio."'27
The second situation referred to by the Court in its opinion was the
commission by the defendant of a single or isolated act in a state.
24. Cases reaching this result were People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco
Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1915) ; Green v.
Chicago, B.&Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8 (1907).
25. 326 U.S. at 318. The cases cited were Missouri, K.&T. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds,
255 U.S. 565 (1920) and Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E.
915 (1917).
26. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
27. Id. at 447 (emphasis original).
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Where this is the case, it would be unreasonable to subject a defendant
to suit on a foreign cause of action. But there were single or occasional
acts which, "because of their nature and quality and the circumstances
of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation
liable to suit"2 on causes of action arising from those acts.
The leading case dealing with jurisdiction based on a "single act"
is McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.2 9 In that case, a California
resident had purchased a life insurance policy from an Arizona corpo-
ration. The defendant corporation, whose principal place of business
was in Texas, had thereafter assumed the obligations of the Arizona
corporation. For about two years, the Texas insurance company had
serviced the policy by mail. The company had no office or agent in
California nor had any connection with California except for this
insurance policy. Upon the death of the insured, the company refused
to pay on the policy. The state of California claimed the right to
take jurisdiction over the controversy.
The approach of the Court was to weigh the interests of the
state of California and of the immediate participants. It arrived at the
conclusion that the balance of interests was in favor of permitting
California to exercise judicial authority over the case. The state of
California, stated the Court, "has a manifest interest in providing
effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to
pay claims". 3' The controversy was based on a contract which had
"substantial connection"'" with California and in which state the
crucial witnesses were found. The plaintiff would be at a severe dis-
advantage if she had to go to Texas to assert her claim and possibly
was not able to afford the cost of bringing an action in Texas. It is
true that the defendant may find it inconvenient to defend the suit in
California, but its business is conducted across state lines. Modern
transportation and communication facilities permit a business organi-
zation to take part in litigation in the places where it engages in eco-
nomic activity.
The Supreme Court has not dealt with the problem of jurisdiction
over natural persons arising from acts within the state since the Doherty
case in 1935. However, the doctrines of the International Shoe case
should be applicable to individuals as well as corporations. The rationale
in McGee would be the same whether the defendant was operating in
the corporate form or not. Thus, in place of two lines of cases, each
with its own fictions and technicalities, we now have a single line of
decisions based on a rule of reason.
Since the International Shoe case, there has been a growing move-
ment by the states to enact "long arm" or "single act" statutes asserting
28. 326 U.S. at 318. One of the circumstances which was subsequently held to
be a decisive factor in determining jurisdiction in such cases was whether "the defen-
dant purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). An act committed in a state without such pur-
posefulness will, therefore, not provide the basis for jurisdiction.
29. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
30. Id. at 223.
31. Ibid.
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jurisdiction on the basis of acts within the state." As of 1960, the
Harvard Law Review in its survey of developments in the field of
state court jurisdiction listed eight such states.3" Three of those
states applied their statutes to individuals as well as corporations.
3 1
The 1962 Annual Survey of American Law lists eight additional states
having expanded jurisdictional statutes . 5  The 1963 survey added
two more3 6 , and four were added in the 1964 survey.
37
The development described has been directed towards the placing
of judicial authority in states where both parties may conveniently
present their claims and where the forum is directly concerned with
the events of the case. However, it is still possible under the old
doctrines to have a case tried in a particular state for the sole reason
that the defendant, if an individual, was served with a summons while
temporarily there; or if a corporation, that it was organized under the
laws of that state even though all of its operations are conducted else-
where. Resistance to the exercise of jurisdiction in these situations
led to the formulation by the courts of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Under this doctrine, a court may exercise its discretion to
dismiss a case, although jurisdiction otherwise exists, if that court is
an inappropriate or inconvenient forum, e.g., where neither the parties
nor the events giving rise to the dispute have a substantial relation to
that state. The United States Supreme Court upheld the doctrine
against attack based on the privileges and immunities clause of the
United States Constitution, which, it was claimed, guaranteed access
to the courts of a state to citizens of other states, by finding that the
discrimination admittedly practiced was based on residence and not
citizenship.3 8
32. For a general description of this trend see Reese & Galston, Doing An Act
or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REv. 249
(1959) ; Note, Jurisdiction - Basis and Range of Process - Recent Developments -
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 49 MICH. L. Rev. 881 (1951) ; Note, Single Act Statutes
and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 43 VA. L. Rev. 1105 (1957).
33. Note, Developments in the Law: State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
Rev. 909, 1003 n.604 (1960). The states listed, with their statutory references, are
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (b) (1959) ; ME. LAWS ch. 317 (1959) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-145 (Supp. 1959); VT. STAT.
tit. 9, ch. 72, § 1562 (1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3083 (1961) ; Wisc. STAT.
ANN. § 262.05 (1957). Maryland was also listed on the basis of MD. CODE ANN.
art. 23, § 92(d) (1957). On this section of the Maryland Code, see notes 72-80
infra and accompanying text.
34. These were Illinois, Maine and Wisconsin.
35. 1962 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 45. These were: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-339(1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-35-19 (Supp. 1961) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 33-519 (1960); IowA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.701-
.735 (Temporary volume 1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1965); N.Y.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES 302; TEXAS REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031(b)
(Supp. 1963).
36. 1963 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 58. ARIZONA R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2) (1956) and
MONTANA REV. CODE ANN. § 93-2702-2, Rule 4B(1) (Supp. 1965).
37. 1964 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 71. KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (1964);
Mo. REV. STATS. §§ 351.630(2)-(5), 355, 375(2)-(5) (1949) ; S.D. COD § 11.2002
(1939) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.185 (1962).
38. Douglas v. New York, N.H.&H. Ry. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). The Court
argued that since citizenship and residence were not completely identical, a state could
discriminate on the basis of residence, although it could not discriminate on the
basis of citizenship. This reasoning hardly meets the problem since residence and
citizenship are usually co-extensive. It has been suggested that the Constitution
1966]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The negative aspects of forum non conveniens bear a striking
similarity to the positive requirements of International Shoe. The
Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert9 divided the factors to be
considered in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens into two
categories, "the private interest of the litigant" and "factors of public
interest". In the first category fall considerations of access to sources
of proof, availability of witnesses and enforceability of any judgment
obtained. The second category is described as including such matters
as the promotion of better administration of the courts; the benefits of
having the litigation in the place which has a close relation to the
controversy in the public view of those outsiders who may be affected
by the outcome; and the additional benefit of having the case in the
forum whose own law will govern. This similarity between the two
doctrines has led to the prediction that the future may see their
amalgamation to result in nationwide jurisdictions based on fair notice
limited by the principles of "forum conveniens".4°
THE LAW IN MARYLAND PRIOR To 1964
Judicial jurisdiction in Maryland prior to the 1964 "long arm"
statute, by and large, followed the same pattern as the due process
decisions of the United States Supreme Court before the International
Shoe case. A few provisions of Maryland law did go beyond the stated
limits of due process as then laid down, but even these were placed with
the pre-International Shoe framework and were largely ineffective.
The older enactments are still valid, since the 1964 act does not replace
them but is supplementary thereto.41
The basic element in this framework is the separate treatment of
individuals and corporations producing two distinct lines of statutory
and case law. As with constitutional decisions, the basic rule in
Maryland with regard to individuals was the requirement of personal
service within the state, 42 while the most fundamental jurisdictional
authority over corporations was that over corporations organized under
Maryland law.4"
Expansion of the bases for jurisdiction came by way of statutory
enactment. The oldest of these statutes is the one asserting jurisdiction
over foreign corporations doing business in Maryland.44 The present
protects only unreasonable discrimination against the non-citizen, and forum non
conveniens is a reasonable discrimination. Note, Developments in the Law, supra
note 33, at 1010 n.656.
39. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
40. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT op LAWS 79 (1962).
41. MD. CODE ANN. art. 75, § 99 (Supp. 1965).
42. MD. R.P. 104(b).
43. MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 94 et seq. (1957). Included under this provision
are unincorporated associations and joint stock companies formed under Maryland law.
44. One of the early cases applying this type of statute is Cromwell v. Royal
Can. Ins. Co., 49 Md. 366 (1878). The specific enactment in question was the
Act of 1868, ch. 471, § 211.
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statute, which is found in article 23, §§ 92(a) & (b) of the Maryland
Code, is as follows:
(a) Causes of action which subject corporations to suit by
resident - Every foreign corporation doing intrastate or
interstate or foreign business in this State shall be subject
to suit in the State by a resident of this State or a
person who has a usual place of business in this State,
(1) on any cause of action arising out of such business,
and (2) on any cause of action arising outside of this
State.
(b) Causes of action which subject corporations to suit by
nonresident-Every foreign corporation doing intrastate
or interstate or foreign business in this State shall be sub-
ject to suit in this State by a nonresident of this State, (1)
on any cause of action arising out of such business, and
(2) provided that the bringing of such suit in this
State is not an undue burden upon the defendant or upon
interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action,
arising outside of this State.
Whether or not a foreign corporation has qualified to do business
in the state is of no import. So long as it does business here, it is
subject to suit on a cause of action arising from such business and,
with certain qualifications as to a non-resident plaintiff, on a cause of
action arising outside the state. These provisions raise two important
questions:
1) What actually constitutes "doing business" under the
statute?
2) When a corporation does business in the state, may it
constitutionally be subject to suit on a foreign cause of
action ? 5
WHAT Is "DOING BUSINESS" UNDER ARTICLE 23,§§ 92(a) & (b)?
In Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court,46 Justice Tray-
nor of the California Supreme Court stated:
The statute authorizes service of process on foreign corpo-
rations that are "doing business in this State". That term is a
descriptive one that the courts have equated with such minimum
contacts with the state "that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'...."
45. For an earlier discussion of these questions see Reiblich, Jurisdiction of
Maryland Courts over Foreign Corporations Under the Act of 1937, 3 MD. L. lzv. 35,
37-54 (1938).
46. 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
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Whatever limitation it imposes is equivalent to that of the due
process clause.47
He justified his decision by reasoning that "doing business was
adopted as a test not for immunity but for jurisdiction, consonant with
the then tenor of the due process clause .... As these concepts became
more flexible ... the wording of the 1872 statute yielded a correspond-
ingly flexible meaning. '48 Other states, taking a contrary view, have held
that "doing business" under their statutes retains the same meaning as it
had prior to the International Shoe decision.49
What position Maryland takes on this question has recently been
the subject of a highly interesting discussion in the federal courts.
Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas ° was a suit by a seaman for injuries
sustained aboard a vessel in Baltimore harbor. The defendant was a
Panamanian corporation. During a period of approximately nine years,
the vessel had called at the port of Baltimore for short periods of time
on six occasions. The defendant argued that it was not subject to
Maryland jurisdiction since it was not "doing business" in Maryland.
Judge Watkins in the District Court 5 agreed with the defendant. He
held that although under the International Shoe decision, a single act
in a state could be the basis for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation,
the Maryland statute requires "doing business" which connotes regu-
larity and continuity in the activities. Although in 1937 the word
"regularly", which modified "doing business", had been dropped from
the statute, 52 there was no intent to eliminate this requirement from
the law, since it was constitutionally required at that time.53 Since
the visits of the defendant's vessel to Maryland involved isolated trans-
actions and were neither regular nor continuous, the defendant was not
subject to Maryland jurisdiction.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge
Sobeloff,"4 disagreed and concluded that Maryland should be classified
among those states which take the view that "the legislature intended
to adopt a flexible measure that would be as expansive and dynamic as
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will reasonably
47. 323 P.2d at 439.
48. Traynor, Is this Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TzxAs L. Rev. 657, 658-59
(1959). Decisions reaching the same conclusions are Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v.
Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962); Sanders Assoc., Inc. v. Galion Iron Works
& Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1962); Superior Distributing Corp. v. Hargrove,
312 P.2d 893 (Okla. 1957) ; Enco, Inc. v. F. C. Russell Co., 210 Ore. 324, 311 P.2d
737 (1957).
49. Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1953)
Petroleum Financial Corp. v. Stone, 111 F. Supp. 351 (S.D. N.Y. 1953) ; McGriff v.
Charles Antell, Inc., 123 Utah 166, 256 P.2d 703 (1953).
50. 221 F. Supp. 253 (D. Md. 1963), rev'd, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965), noted
in 25 MD. L. Riv. 361 (1965).
51. 221 F. Supp. at 259-60.
52. Laws of Md. ch. 504, §§ 118(a) and (b) (1937).
53. Earlier Maryland cases reflecting this requirement and holding that a single
or isolated transaction is not "doing business" are Carter v. Reardon-Smith Line, 148
Md. 545, 129 Atl. 839 (1925) ; Baden v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 133 Md. 602,
105 Ati. 860 (1919); Crook v. Girard Iron Co., 87 Md. 138, 39 Atl. 94 (1898).
54. 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965).
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permit". 5 The opinion emphasized that in eliminating the word "regu-
larly" from the statute in 1937, the "General Assembly was releasing
the standard from the moorings of its specific wording and casting it
adrift on the tide of constitutional due process"." 6 Finding that the
facts of the case fell within the constitutionally permissible limits of
due process, the court held the defendant to be subject to Maryland
jurisdiction.5 7
The last word on this question can only be given by the Maryland
Court of Appeals. The decision of that body is binding not only as to
state court jurisdiction but, according to almost all authorities, also
affects federal court jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases.5"
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in the
Gkiafis case, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided a case involving
the interpretation of "doing business". Gilliam v. Moog Industries,
Inc. " was a suit for breach of a contract of employment under which
the plaintiff was employed as district manager of an area that included
Maryland. The defendant was a manufacturer of auto replacement
parts which it sold to distributors, two of which were located in Mary-
land. The plaintiff, together with an assistant, had promoted the sale
of defendant's products in Maryland by calling on the warehouse dis-
tributors, jobbers and customers of jobbers, and conducting demonstra-
tions of the products. The court denied jurisdiction over the defendant
on the ground that the activities added up to nothing more than
solicitation of business, which did not amount to "doing business".
In response to the plaintiff's argument that the 1964 "long arm"
statute would uphold jurisdiction, the court stated that although the
purpose of the new statute was to provide the maximum constitutional
scope to Maryland jurisdiction and that the defendant might be subject
to Maryland jurisdiction under the new statute, it would not decide
that question since it had not been presented properly to the lower
court. Had the court decided that question, it seems likely that it
would have found jurisdiction to exist, since the facts of the Gilliam
case are similar to those of the International Shoe case. The Maryland
Court of Appeals can hardly be said to have equated the "doing busi-
55. Id. at 550.
56. Id. at 552.
57. The sweeping nature of the opinion is somewhat reduced by the court's
recognition that art. 23, § 88(b), which states that a foreign corporation shall not
be considered to be doing intrastate business if it is engaged in "conducting an
isolated transaction not in the course of a number of transactions of like nature",
may modify the jurisdictional standard of §§ 92(a) & (b), id. at 553 n.10. Judge
Watkins had argued that if an isolated intrastate transaction does not constitute the
doing of intrastate business, it logically follows that an isolated interstate or foreign
transaction cannot subject a foreign corporation to Maryland jurisdiction under the
statute. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals met this argument by holding that
under the facts of the Gkiafis case, the vessel had been engaged in "the course of a
number of transactions of like nature" in its series of visits to the state.
58. Holding that, unless otherwise provided, amenability to jurisdiction in a
diversity case in the federal courts is no broader than amenability to jurisdiction in
the state courts of the forum state are Arrowsmith v. United Press International,
320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963) ;
Walker v. General Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Smartt v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1963).
59. 239 Md. 107, 210 A.2d 390 (1965).
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ness" statute with the limits of due process. As shown by the Gilliam
case, the rule that continuous solicitation of orders by an agent for
goods to be shipped into the state to the purchaser is not sufficient to
constitute doing business, continued to be applied after International
Shoe as prior thereto.60
In 1953,"1 the Maryland Court of Appeals described the pattern of
activities by which a foreign corporation might exploit a market in
the state without being subject to the state's jurisdiction in the following
manner:
A foreign corporation which has its principal business in
another state, sells its products to distributors outside of that
state and the products are shipped f.o.b. with drafts attached. A
district superintendent is employed whose territory includes
foreign states. He visits distributors and dealers and advises
them how to sell the products, how to keep up their stock of goods,
and selects new dealers subject to the approval of the company.
All contracts are executed by an officer of the corporation outside
of the foreign state, the district superintendent having no authority
to finally ratify any contracts.62
Operating to ameliorate the unfairness in this situation was the
availability of the rule that if there is "solicitation plus" rather than
"mere solicitation", there is "doing business" in the state. Since the
International Shoe decision, some courts have found the "plus" factor
even in those activities which seem to be part of the solicitation effort
itself."3 In Maryland the following have been found to be sufficient for
the "plus" factor: the demonstrating of the product followed by the
acceptance by the sales representatives of certain orders without fac-
tory approval, plus the inspection of the jobs in which the product was
used to enable the corporation to issue a bond guaranteeing the work ;64
the maintenance by the corporation of an inventory of its products
within the state for more convenient shipment to its distributors;5
the conducting of research and field tests of its products in actual use in
the state.66
A second type of case in which "doing business" was found to
exist occurred where the foreign corporation was represented in the
state by what appeared to be an independent contractor, but because
of the extensive control over the representative of the corporation, the
relationship was characterized as being that of principal and agent.
60. Other cases applying this rule are Chesapeake Supply & Equipment Co. v.
Manitowoc, 232 Md. 555, 194 A.2d 624 (1963) ; G.E.M., Inc. v. Plough, Inc., 228
Md. 484, 180 A.2d 478 (1961); Feldman v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d
428 (1957).
61. Thomas v. Hudson Sales Corp., 204 Md. 450, 105 A.2d 225 (1953).
62. Id. at 458, 105 A.2d at 228.
63. See Fiore v. Family Pub. Serv., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Mo. 1957);
Prime Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 3 Wisc. 2d 156, 87 N.W.2d 788 (1958).
64. Win. Barnes Hall, Inc. v. Flintkote Co., 139 F. Supp. 32 (D. Md. 1956).
65. Becker v. General Motors Corp., 167 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1958).
66. White v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 235 Md. 368, 201 A.2d 856 (1964).
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The court disregarded the form for the substance to find the local dis-
tributor to be in effect a branch office of the foreign corporation.6 7
These cases can only be understood as laying down the same basic
requirements for doing business after International Shoe as before. It
would not be unreasonable to conclude that in post-International Shoe
cases, in view of the new constitutional principles, the court was some-
what more amenable to finding the "plus" factor in solicitation cases
or in finding sufficient control over a local distributor to subject a
foreign corporation to Maryland jurisdiction. The expansion of Mary-
land jurisdiction over foreign corporations was not, in any case, a wide
one and hardly to the permissible constitutional limits. In view of the
enactment of the 1964 "long arm" statute, the question at this time
is an academic one and further clarification by the Court of Appeals
would seem to be largely superfluous.
MAY A CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS IN MARYLAND
CONSTITUTIONALLY BE SUBJECTED To A SUIT IN
MARYLAND ON A FOREIGN CAUSE OF ACTION?
When a corporation has actually appointed an agent for service
of process and expressly consented to suit in a state, a cause of action
unrelated to that state may be brought if the statute so provides.6"
However, the decisions in the International Shoe and Perkins cases
clearly indicate that where there is no actual appointment of an agent,
the answer to this question depends upon the specific facts of each
case. 9 Jurisdiction is to be determined on the basis of the substance
and nature of the actual operations of the particular corporation with-
in the state. The ultimate question is whether it is-reasonable, in view
of those operations, to subject the corporation to a local suit on a
foreign cause of action. The approach which took it for granted that
the provisions of § 92 as to causes of action arising outside of the
state was valid in all cases7" is, therefore, subject to reappraisal.
In this respect, the International Shoe case has served to limit
claims to judicial jurisdiction. The old concept of corporate "presence"
in the state, at least in theory, could make no distinction as to where
the cause of action arose.7' On the other hand, under the International
Shoe approach of fairness to the defendant, although a foreign corpo-
ration may be carrying on sufficient activities within a state to make it
fair to be subjected to suit on a cause of action connected with those
67. Kahn v. Maico Co., 216 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1954); La Porte Heinekamp
Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 24 F.2d 861 (D. Md. 1928); White v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., supra note 66; Thomas v. Hudson Sales Co., 204 Md. 450, 105 A.2d 225(1953) ; State v. Penn. Steel Co., 123 Md. 212, 91 Atl. 136 (1914).
68. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93(1917). See Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. J. B. Hunt & Sons, Inc., 260 N.C. 717,
133 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1963).
69. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Hagerstown Brewing Co. v. Gates, 117 Md. 348, 83 At]. 570 (1912).
Some recent cases still take the position that a foreign corporation is subject tojurisdiction on a foreign cause of action if it is doing business in the state. See, e.g.,
Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ortiz, 50 Tenn. App. 317, 361 S.W.2d 113 (1962);
Kirkland v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. Co., 114 Ga. App. 200, 121 S.E.2d 411 (1961).
In neither of these cases is the problem presented by the Perkins case even discussed.
71. See note 10 supra.
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activities, it could validly claim inconvenience in having to defend a
suit whose underlying events took place a great distance away.
If the principal place of business or the home office of the corpo-
ration were located in the state, the argument of inconvenience would
carry little weight. Aside from this situation, the activities of the
corporation in the state would have to be of an exceptional nature to
satisfy the fairness approach as to a foreign cause of action. It would
seem that the requirement of § 92(b), that a non-resident of Maryland
may sue a foreign corporation on a cause of action arising outside the
state "provided that the bringing of such suit in this state is not an
undue burden upon the defendant," is now a constitutional requirement
in all cases and therefore limits the resident plaintiff as well as the
non-resident plaintiff.
THE MARYLAND "SHORT ARM" - SECTION 92 (d)
In 1937, the Maryland legislature established what was un-
doubtedly, at that time, a pioneering breakthrough in the field of
judicial jurisdiction. 2 A contemporary article termed the section, a
"new and unique provision of the law". 73 The customary doing busi-
ness sections were supplemented by an additional provision which
stated that:
[E]very foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this
State by a resident of this State or by a person having a usual place
of business within the State on any cause of action arising out of a
contract made within this State or liability incurred for acts done
within this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is doing
or has done business in this State.74
Application of this section proved to be less successful and less
far-reaching than was probably anticipated by its sponsors. At the
outset, the statute eliminates from its provisions plaintiffs who are
non-residents or who do not have a usual place of business in Mary-
land. Thus, it could not be used by a foreign seaman injured in the
port of Baltimore,75 nor even by a resident of Maryland who sought to
obtain jurisdiction by attaching the claim of a non-resident defendant
against a foreign corporation. 6
Conferring jurisdiction on Maryland courts "on any cause of
action arising out of a contract made within this state" permitted easy
circumvention by foreign corporations which could manipulate the
place of the final act in the process of negotiations. Thus, a foreign
manufacturer which regularly sells its products in Maryland through
a local distributor to local purchasers, by making its purchase orders
subject to acceptance or rejection at the home office, would not be
72. Laws of Md. ch. 504, § 118(d) (1937).
73. Reiblich, supra note 45, at 67.
74. MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 92(d) (1957).
75. Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 221 F. Supp. 253 (D. Md. 1963), rev'd,
342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965).
76. Thomas v. Hudson Sales Corp., 204 Md. 450, 105 A.2d 225 (1953). Cf. Cole
v. Randall Park Holding Co., 201 Md. 616, 95 A.2d 272 (1953).
[VOL. XXVI
"LONG ARM" COMES To MARYLAND
subject to Maryland jurisdiction, even though all the events leading to
the agreement took place in Maryland, since the acceptance of the
order is "the last act that made the transaction a binding contract".77
The case cited for successful use of this provision is Compania de
Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.78 This case, which was decided
after International Shoe, made clear that the provisions of section 92 (d)
could not be constitutionally applied to all cases indiscriminately even
though falling within the literal wording of the section. The court
stated that the validity of the application of the section must be deter-
mined by "the extent that it is a reasonable exercise of the state's
regulatory control under all the facts involved."1 79
Ironically, the defendant, which was a Panamanian corporation
engaged in exporting bananas from Ecuador to various countries, had
no contacts with Maryland other than the contract which was the
subject of the suit. In upholding jurisdiction, the court emphasized the
fact that in addition to the making of the contract in Maryland, the
negotiations leading up to the contract were carried on here.
The only case where jurisdiction has been found to exist on the
basis of "liability incurred for acts done within this state" is Johns
v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.80 There, injury was alleged to
have been caused by the combined operation of a grinding machine
manufactured by a Texas corporation and an abrasive wheel manu-
factured by a Massachusetts corporation, both purchased from a local
distributor. Each corporation had a sales representative who regu-
larly spent part of his time in Maryland promoting sales. The repre-
sentative of the Texas corporation had recommended the purchase
of these two items for the particular job. The court found jurisdic-
tion to exist over this corporation on the basis of a tort occurring in
Maryland, i.e., the misrepresentation as to the safety of the recom-
mended tools used in combination with each other. Noting the con-
tinuous activity of the representative in Maryland, the court found
there was more than a single isolated transaction and for this reason,
the application of the statute did not violate due process.
JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS -
Article 75, § 78
In 1955, the Maryland legislature enacted the following pro-
vision,8' at present found in art. 75, § 78 of the Maryland Code:
Any nonresident, person, firm, partnership, general or limited,
not qualified under the laws of this State as to doing business
herein, who shall do any business or perform any character of
77. Chesapeake Supply & Equipment Co. v. Manitowoc, 232 Md. 555, 567, 194
A.2d 624, 630 (1963). Note the similarity to the method of operation which cir-
cumvented jurisdiction based on "doing business" in the state. See notes 60 and 61
supra and accompanying text.
78. 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954).
79. Id. at 256, 107 A.2d at 365. See Maryland National Bank v. Shaffer Stores
Co., 240 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md. 1965).
80. 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
81. Laws of Md. ch. 297 (1955).
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work or service in this State, shall, by the doing of such business
or the performing of such work, or services, be deemed to have
appointed the Secretary of State to be the true and lawful attorney
or agent of such nonresident, upon whom process may be served in
any action accrued or accruing from the doing of such business,
or the performing of such work, or services, or as an incident
thereto by any such nonresident, or his, its or their agent, servant
or employee.
Two aspects of the section reveal the influence of International
Shoe. The first concerns the type of activity which is made the basis
for jurisdiction. The Hess and Doherty decisions which were the last
Supreme Court pronouncements directly involving non-resident indi-
viduals dealt with exceptional situations - the use of motor vehicles
and the sale of corporate securities.8 2 The statute, however, follows the
logic of International Shoe, which is applied to individuals as well as
corporations and covers the normal type of activity as well as the
exceptional. A second aspect of the enactment revealing the influence
of the new approach to jurisdiction of International Shoe involves
the extent of the activity necessary for jurisdiction. Non-resident in-
dividuals made subject to Maryland jurisdiction are those "who shall
do any business or perform any character of work or service in this
state". Less than the traditional "doing business" seems to be con-
templated. Supporting this conclusion is the limitation that the cause
of action must arise out of the acts performed within the state.
Too few cases have been decided under this section to provide any
clear interpretation of the exact scope of the activities falling within
its purview. 3 The enactment of the 1964 "long arm" statute, which
makes unlikely future use of this section, probably prevents further
case law development on this question. In view of the subsequent legis-
lation, the 1955 act may be viewed as a stop-gap measure pending the
assertion of judicial jurisdiction to the full extent constitutionally per-
mitted.
MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES
Prior to the 1964 act, various other statutes had been enacted in
response to the due process decisions of the Supreme Court. The enact-
82. See notes 19 and 20 supra and accompanying text.
83. In Baltimore Lumber Co. v. Marcus, 208 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md. 1962), the
court found the defendant, a Pennsylvania citizen, subject to Maryland jurisdiction
where he had been in the state soliciting contracts for garage constructions, had
managed the affairs of the business in the state for about a week and had made a
personal undertaking guaranteeing payment for supplies.
The reference in the statute to those "not qualified under the laws of this state
as to doing business herein" has led one court to conclude that it covers only those
non-resident individuals who are required to qualify or obtain a license to do business
in Maryland but fail to do so. Harris v. Craig, 145 The Daily Record (Baltimore)
128, p. 5 (Super. Ct. of Baltimore City, Dec. 3, 1960). Taking the more logical point
of view that the statute applies to all non-residents who do not qualify and thus have
not appointed an agent to receive process, whether or not qualification is required,
are the Baltimore Lumber case and Maternity Trousseau, Inc. v. Maternity Mart
of Baltimore, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1961).
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ment in 1929 of a statute asserting jurisdiction over non-resident
motorists"4 can be traced back to the Hess decision of 1927.85 This
was later followed by acts covering non-resident aviators and users of
waterways. 6
The provisions of the Maryland Securities Act 7 under which
jurisdiction is obtained in a civil suit on the basis of prohibited conduct
involving the offer or sale of securities in the state complies with the
decision in the Doherty case of 1935.88 The concept of judicial juris-
diction based on conduct subject to special regulation would also seem
to cover real estate sales; hence the requirement that non-residents who
apply for a license to "engage in or carry on the business of or act in
the capacity of a real estate broker or real estate salesman within this
state" must file an irrevocable consent to the jurisdiction of the Mary-
land courts.8 9
Subjecting a foreign electrical corporation which constructs or
operates electric transmission or distribution lines in the state to local
jurisdiction" would not seem to go beyond the pre-International Shoe
concept of "doing business". Chronologically, the assertion of this
jurisdiction in Maryland9 1 antedates the International Shoe case by
four years.
A particular area which was affected by the International Shoe
decision is that of jurisdiction over foreign insurance companies which
fail to qualify to engage in the insurance business in the state.92
The Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, enacted in 1949,9" provides
for jurisdiction over foreign insurers on the basis of "(1) the issuance
or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this State or to
corporations authorized to do business therein, (2) the solicitation of
applications for such contracts, (3) the collection of premiums, mem-
bership fees, assessments or other considerations for such contracts, or
(4) any other transaction of insurance business, . . ."" which is
effected by mail or otherwise in any action by or on behalf of an
insured or beneficiary arising out of any of such contracts of insurance.
In the one decision which has touched on this provision, it was
noted that "the activities listed ... are referred to as 'transaction of in-
surance business', not as 'doing business' within the state. 'Transaction
of business' has a broader meaning than 'doing business'."9 5 Coinciden-
84. MD. CODe ANN. art. 66%, § 115 (1957). For a history of this statute,
see Hunt v. Tague, 205 Md. 369, 109 A.2d 80 (1954).
85. Supra note 19.
86. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 75, §§ 76, 77 (1957).
87. MD. CODE ANN. art. 32A, §§ 38(g) & (h) (Supp. 1965).
88. Supra note 20.
89. MD. CODn ANN. art. 56, §§ 217(a), 219(d) (1957).
90. MD. COne ANN. art. 23, § 406 (1957).
91. Laws of Md. ch. 907, § 487 (1941).
92. Jurisdiction over foreign companies which do qualify is covered by MD. CODe
ANN. art. 48A, § 57 (1957) (foreign insurers) and art. 48A, § 347 (fraternal benefit
societies).
93. Laws of Md. ch. 450 (1949). The act was first promulgated by the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1938. 9C UNIvORM LAWS ANN. 306 (1957).
94. MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 204 (1959).
95. Rosenberg v. Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 154 F. Supp. 6, 10 (D. Md. 1957). See
notes 122-43 infra and accompanying text concerning the phrase "transaction of
business" under the 1964 "long arm" statute. A decision which limits somewhat the
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tally, almost at the same time that this statement was made, the United
States Supreme Court was deciding the McGee case9" upholding the
constitutionality of the California Unauthorized Insurers Process
Act9", which is almost identical to the Maryland act.
THE 1964 "LONG ARM" STATUTE
The statute is comprised of 7 sections. 8 The first three lay down
the expanded grounds for jurisdiction.9 Two give general directions
for rules as to service of process.'00 One codifies the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, '° and one makes clear that all other existing bases for
jurisdiction are unaffected.' 0 2
It is the first three sections of the act (sections 94-96) dealing
with the bases for judicial jurisdiction to which the balance of this
article will be devoted. Section 94 identifies the defendants made sub-
ject to the provisions of the act. Section 95 identifies those defendants
who are subject to Maryland jurisdiction as to any cause of action,
including those arising from out-of-state transactions. Section 96
enumerates various activities within or connected with the state on the
basis of which Maryland courts have jurisdiction over causes of
action arising out of those activities.
It should be noted at the outset that while analysis of the
statute entails a dual focus - first, that of statutory interpretation and
second, that of constitutional regulation - the two will be found to be
very closely interrelated. Legislative purpose, to a large degree, was
the expansion of judicial jurisdiction up to but not beyond the outer-
most limits permitted by the Supreme Court's due process decisions.
Consideration of the constitutional question in each situation is, there-
fore, essential not only for its own purpose, but also as an important
factor in statutory interpretation.
SECTION 94 - DEFENDANTS MADE SUBJECT To THE ACT
The scope of the statute as to those defendants made subject to
its provisions is an all-inclusive one. A "person" over whom the
courts are to obtain personal jurisdiction under the act is defined as
"an individual or his executor, administrator or other personal repre-
sentative, or a corporation, partnership, association, or any other legal
or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this
State and whether or not organized under the laws of this State."' 3
scope of the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act is Wash. v. Western Empire Life
Ins. Co., 298 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1962), which held that an insurance company is not
subject to the provisions of the act where it has no knowledge of its agents act in
selling the policy sued on, and the agent had no actual authority to sell the policy to
a resident of that state.
96. Supra note 29.
97. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-20.
98. MD. CODs ANN. art. 75, §§ 94-100 (Supp. 1965).
99. MD. CODE ANN. art. 75, §§ 94-96 (Supp. 1965).
100. MD. COng ANN. art. 75, §§ 97, 100 (Supp. 1965).
101. MD. COD ANN. art. 75, § 98 (Supp. 1965).
102. MD. COD ANN. art. 75, § 99 (Supp. 1965).
103. MD. CODS ANN. art. 75, § 94 (Supp. 1965).
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The rationale of International Shoe, that jurisdictional principles are
basically the same for all defendants, individuals, corporations and
unincorporated associations, where the latter is subject to suit as an
entity, is apparent.
An interesting question raised by this section is the status in
Maryland of a partnership as a defendant. The common law rule is
that an action against a partnership could not be brought against the
firm alone, but all partners composing the firm were to be named as
defendants.' 0 4 It has been stated that this is also the present rule in
Maryland.' °5 On the other hand, the query has been raised whether a
partnership may be considered an "unincorporated association" under
article 23, § 138 of the Code which permits suit against an association
in the group name.' 6 The definition of person in section 94 as
including a "partnership, association, or any other legal or commercial
entity" may strengthen the claim that a partnership may now be sued
as an entity in the partnership name as an alternative to suing all the
members of the partnership.
The inclusion in the section of the personal representative of an
individual allows the acquisition of jurisdiction when the acts of a
deceased or an incompetent provide the basis for jurisdiction. 10 7
SECTION 95 - DEFENDANT SUBJECT To JURISDICTION As
To ANY CAUSE OF ACTION
By virtue of section 95, "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or main-
taining his or its principal place of business in this State as to any
cause of action."'0 8 The rationale of this section is the notion that it is
fair and reasonable for a state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant
having a close and enduring relationship with it as to any cause of
action. In the case of an individual, this requirement is fulfilled if he
is either domiciled or has his principal place of business in the state.
A corporation or other association, which has its raison d'etre in its
commercial activities, is made subject to such over-all jurisdiction if
it is organized under the laws of the state or has its principal place of
business in the state.
As previously pointed out, jurisdiction as to any cause of action
over an individual based on his domicile clearly satisfies the require-
ments of due process.' This is also true of jurisdiction based on
104. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 466 (3d ed. 1923).
105. 1 Poe, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 385B (5th ed. 1925) ; 17 MD. LAW ENCY.
Partnership § 151 (1961).
106. 1 SYKEs and TABOR, MD. LAW ENCY. Procedural Forms § 316 (1964). This
was the decision reached in Feldman Insurance Agency v. B&F Transportation, Inc.,
145 The Daily Record (Baltimore) 13, p. 2 (Circuit Ct. for Prince George's County,
July 16, 1960).
107. See Commissioners' Note to § 1.01 of the UNIFORM ACT. The Commis-
sioners' Notes to the UNIFORM ACT provide much useful information as to the point
of view of the original authors of the AcT. The text and notes to Article I of the
UNIFORM ACT are found in 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 76-82 (1964 Supp.). See note 2
supra.
108. MD. CODE ANN. art. 75, § 95 (Supp. 1965).
109. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
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organization under the laws of the state or based on having a principal
place of business in the state.' Such jurisdiction over an individual
is a new concept introduced into Maryland law by the 1964 act. Prior
thereto, the only relationship which provided the basis for jurisdiction
was the unhappy one of being the recipient, while within the territory
of the state, of service of process."' A domestic corporation or un-
incorporated association is, under prior statute, subject to the juris-
diction of the Maryland courts as to any cause of action.1 2 In this
respect, the 1964 act does not introduce anything new. However, the
provision concerning a foreign corporation or association having its
principal place of business in the state provides some interesting com-
parisons with prior law - specifically, article 23, §§ 92(a) & (b). 1
The 1964 act requires a closer bond between the defendant and the
state than article 23 as a basis for local jurisdiction over a foreign
cause of action." 4 For the constitutionally dubious justification based
on "doing business" of article 23, it substitutes the "principal place
of business." Once that closer bond exists, it does not set up any
limitations on suit by a non-resident plaintiff, in contrast to article 23.
A plaintiff suing a foreign corporation or association having its
principal place of business in Maryland on a foreign cause of action
would therefore find the procedures under the 1964 act safer and
probably more convenient." 5 The act would exclude only the unusual
case of a plaintiff who brings a foreign cause of action against a foreign
corporation or association having its principal place of business outside
the state, and who seeks to argue that other contacts of the defendant
with the state are "so substantial and of such a nature" as to justify
local jurisdiction, with the result that article 23 would be the only
basis for attempting suit.
SECTION 96 - BASES FOR JURISDICTION OVER CAUSES
OF ACTION ARISING FROM ACTIVITIES WITHIN OR
CONNECTED WITH THE STATE
The greatest reach of the "long arm" is that of section 96. Section
96(a) provides that:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this State;
(2) contracting to supply services in this State;
110. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
111. See note 42 supra.
112. See note 43 supra.
113. See notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
114. Section 95 also covers suits based on Maryland transactions. However, since
in almost all cases, these would fall under section 96, the fact that defendant has his
principal place of business in Maryland or is a Maryland domiciliary is not the
decisive factor.
115. Under art. 75, § 100, MD. CoDE ANN. (Supp. 1965), the Court of Appeals is
authorized to establish new rules for service of process on defendants made subject to
Maryland jurisdiction by the 1964 act.
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(3) causing tortious injury in this State by an act or
omission in this State;
(4) causing tortious injury in this State by an act or
omission outside the State if he regularly does or
solicits business, engages in any other persistent
course of conduct in this State or derives substantial
revenue from food or services used or consumed in
this State;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real prop-
erty in this State; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this State at the time of con-
tracting. n 6
Section 96(b) makes clear that the cause of action must arise from
the enumerated activities." 7
Some of the categories in 96(a) seem to overlap, and there are
undoubtedly many situations which would fall under more than one
heading. Where this occurs, each subdivision would be sufficient in-
dependently of the others to support Maryland jurisdiction.
(1) "Transacting Any Business In This State"
This subdivision is derived from the statute of Illinois,"' and the
courts of that state have contributed most to the interpretation of its
language." 9 The basic question which has arisen is what kind of
activity amounts to the "transaction of business." It is clear that the
intent of the statute is to require considerably less than what is re-
quired under the "doing business" test.' At the same time, there is
a limit here as well, and not every act in the state will satisfy the
requirement of "transacting business". In view of the purpose of the
statute, the key to statutory interpretation is found in the constitutional
principles of due process.
116. MD. COD ANN. art. 75, § 96(a) (Supp. 1965).
117. Due to an oversight when passed in 1964, § 96(b) read, "When jurisdiction
over a person is based solely upon this section .. " This was corrected in 1965 to
read, "When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause
of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him."
Laws of Md. ch. 749 (1965). For a good example of the application of this require-
ment see Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964).
118. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 17(1) (a) (1956). See Commissioners' Note to§ 1.03(a) (1) of the UNIFORM ACT.
119. See generally Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois
Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 599, 607-09 (1955-56) ; Currie, The Growth of the Long
Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 560-79
(1963).
120. "The words of subsection (a) of Section 17 cannot be given a restrictive
interpretation based upon the old Illinois 'doing business' cases. The subsection speaks
of 'transaction of any business within this state' not of 'doing business' here." Haas
v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1957). See Rosenberg v.
Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 154 F. Supp. 6 (D. Md. 1957). But see Bay Aviation Services
Co. v. District Court, 149 Colo. 542, 370 P.2d 752 (1962), where the new language
was given as restricted a meaning as the old "doing business" statute.
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Comparison with the "doing business" test shows two areas of
expansion of jurisdiction. One is the solicitation situation, the other,
the isolated transaction in the state. Solicitation without any "plus"
factor, insufficient under the "doing business" test, was the actual
situation in International Shoe. There, the Supreme Court found
jurisdiction to exist on the basis of solicitation alone and pointed out
that the solicitations "were systematic and continuous throughout the
years in question."'' Cases under the Illinois statute have found no
difficulty in classifying such activity as "transaction of business".22
The isolated act presents more difficulties than continuous solicitation.
The International Shoe decision distinguished between "single or
occasional" acts on the basis of their "nature and quality".'2 3 The
McGee case illustrates an isolated transaction held sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. The assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of a single
transaction is not new to Maryland. Article 23, § 92(d) asserts juris-
diction against foreign corporations arising out of a contract made in
the state. The "transaction of business" concept, however, extends such
jurisdiction considerably.
Aside from applying to individuals as well as corporations, this
concept is characterized by a flexibility absent from jurisdiction based
on the making of a contract.' 24 In Natural Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB
Electrolux,'2 5 the court did not concern itself with the place of the
making of the contract out of which the suit arose, but held that
jurisdiction existed since the contract "was the culmination of negotia-
tions, conferences, contracts and meetings between the agents of
plaintiff and defendant. A substantial part thereof occurred in the
State of Illinois."'1 2 6 A contract negotiated in whole or in part in
Maryland but "made" elsewhere would therefore amount to the "trans-
acting of business" in Maryland. But in Kaye-Martin v. Brooks,27
a suit for breach of contract for sale of stock, the same court denied
jurisdiction where a contract was negotiated in Illinois, the Illinois
meeting of the parties having been arranged for convenience because
the defendant seller happened to be attending a convention there.
121. 326 U.S. at 320.
122. See Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
123. 326 U.S. at 318.
124. Jurisdiction based on "transaction of business" is technically broad enough
to cover tort as well as contract cases. See Commissioners' Note to § 1.03 of UNIFORM
AcT. However, in view of the subsequent categories specifically dealing with tort
actions, the typical case under this category is a contract action.
125. 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959).
126. Id. at 475. Among other cases finding "transaction of business" in the state
on the basis of an isolated transaction are: Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 212 F. Supp.
365 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (solicitation by defendant's salesmen of the contract, installa-
tion of the equipment and inspection of the subsequent complaint in Michigan);
Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962) (visit of
defendant to Illinois to inspect the equipment to be purchased by him, the preliminary
negotiations and final acceptance being made by correspondence from defendant in
N.Y. to plaintiff in Illinois) ; Berlemann v. Superior Distributing Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (1958) (solicitation by defendant's representative of a purchase
order for vending machines while agreeing to find locations for the machines and to
train plaintiff to service and maintain them in Illinois) ; Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d
987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963) (visit by defendant's representatives in connection with the
sale, installation and maintenance of the machine).
127. 267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959).
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In that case, "transaction of business" literally took place in Illinois.
However, the accidental "nature and quality" of the transaction was
not such as to justify Illinois jurisdiction. The scope of the statute
was seen as limited by the principle of Hanson v. Denckla,128 that "it
is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws". 29
The same result would logically follow even if the actual execution of the
contract took place at the chance meeting in the state.
The case of Conn v. Whitmore130 suggests another important
limitation on "transaction of business" jurisdiction. There, the Utah
Supreme Court refused to give full faith and credit to an Illinois
judgment based on the following facts: Plaintiff, in the business of
selling horses in Illinois, mailed to defendant, in Utah, a mimeo-
graphed sheet listing the horses for sale. Defendant requested a friend
in Illinois to look at the horses. The report was favorable. Defendant
then mailed a letter to plaintiff containing part payment and stating
that he would purchase the horses. He sent an employee who picked
up the horses in Illinois and delivered a check for the balance of the
purchase price. When defendant stopped payment on the check, plain-
tiff sued and obtained a judgment in Illinois for the balance of the
purchase price. As one of the grounds for its decision, the Utah court
held that even if there was a "transaction of business" in Illinois, juris-
diction over the defendant in this situation offends the "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" required by International
Shoe. The events which took place in Illinois were not fortuitous
or accidental. Yet, as far as the defendant was concerned, there was no
voluntary or purposeful entry into the state. Business was transacted
there because that was where the plaintiff was located. An Illinois
forum would, under the circumstances, be unfair and inconvenient to
the defendant. Since it was the plaintiff who initiated the offer for
business in Utah, it would not be unfair to require him to sue there.
In the Kaye-Martin and Conn cases, jurisdiction was denied even
though the defendant or his agent had engaged in some activity while
physically within the state, since the location of the activity was not
the result of a purposeful choice exercised by the defendant. In Saletko
v. Willeys Motors, Inc., 31 a contract had been negotiated by mail
and telephone between the plaintiff in Illinois and the defendant in Ohio.
The Illinois Appellate Court, basing its decision on Grobart v. Addo
Machine Co., Inc., 8 2 a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, held
that there was no transaction of business in Illinois, in spite of the
fact that it was the defendant who had taken the initiative in contacting
the plaintiff in Illinois. This was justified on the basis that "the per-
formance of jurisdictional acts, by defendant or its agents while
physically present in Illinois, is essential for submission to the juris-
128. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
129. Id. at 253. See Reese & Galston, Doing An Act or Causing Consequences
as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. Rev. 249, 260 (1959).
130. 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959).
131. 36 Ill. App. 2d 7, 183 N.E.2d 569 (1962).
132. 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E2d 73 (1959).
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diction of the courts of this state under section 17(1) (a) .'13  Thus,
while fortuitous physical presence in the state is insufficient to give
jurisdiction, physical absence from the state is a sufficient ground
to deny jurisdiction even though there are other substantial and pur-
poseful contacts with the state.
The argument has been made13 1 that the conclusion of the Saletko
case is no longer the law in Illinois, since in Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp.,13' decided after Grobart, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that there could be the commission of a tortious
act within that state even though the defendant had never physically
been in the state. It is argued that if a tortious act can be committed in
the state even though the defendant is not there, business can also be
transacted in the state in the same way. 36
Whether or not this contention is valid with regard to Illinois,
analysis of the Maryland statute leads to a contrary conclusion. Sub-
divisions (2) and (4) of the Maryland statute specifically define the
circumstances under which a defendant, who is physically outside the
state, is subject to Maryland jurisdiction. These subdivisions do not
have their counterparts in the Illinois statute. The inclusion of an
absent defendant within the "transaction of business" category, reason-
able in Illinois in view of the otherwise existing gap in the statute, is
inconsistent with the overall structure of the Maryland act. This
analysis suggests a further limitation on jurisdiction based on this
subdivision of the 1964 act - that there must be an act by the
defendant or his agent while present within the state to constitute
"transaction of business in the state".
(2) Contracting To Supply Services In This State
This subsection authorizes jurisdiction over a defendant who has
never been in the state. Jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of a con-
tractual obligation to perform certain acts in the state. Does the due
process clause permit a state to take jurisdiction over a cause of action
arising out of a particular transaction where, although the transaction
in its totality has some contact with the state, the defendant at all
times has acted outside the state?
Nowhere in the International Shoe opinion is there any discussion
of this question. The McGee case does have relevance to this inquiry.
There, the defendant insurance company serviced an insurance policy
of a California resident at all times through the mails. No agent of
the company was ever physically present in California. Yet, the
company was held subject to California jurisdiction as to a cause of
action arising out of the policy, since "the suit was based on a contract
133. 183 N.E.2d at 571. Accord, Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Prod., Inc.,
62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).
134. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 566-79 (1963).
135. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) ; see notes 154-55 infra and accom-
panying text.
136. W. Va. jurisdiction was upheld where a contract resulted from an offer made
by the defendant in Ohio and accepted by the plaintiff in W. Va. during a telephone
conversation. State ex rel. Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp, 131 S.E.2d 81 (W. Va. 1963).
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which had substantial connection' ' a37 with California. The scope of the
McGee decision is, however, thrown into question by a statement in
the Hanson case that McGee concerned "an activity that the state treats
as exceptional and subject to special regulation,' 1 38 thus intimating that
McGee, especially where it breaks totally new ground, may be limited
to exceptional cases.'3 9
Decisions in the lower courts are conflicting. One of the earliest
statutes of this type is that of North Carolina. That statute provides for
North Carolina jurisdiction over foreign corporations based on "the
production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such corporation
with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or
consumed in this State and are so used or consumed. .... In
Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,'4 ' the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held the statute unconstitutional in a suit based on a claim of
defective merchandise shipped from New York to North Carolina. The
court stated that the International Shoe decision does not "sustain
jurisdiction in the North Carolina courts, where the only contact has
been a single interstate shipment into North Carolina."' 42 The same
result was reached by the Supreme Court of North Carolina the
following year. 43 A subsequent North Carolina case did hold the
statute constitutional.' However, in that case, the defendant's total
operation in the state was continuous and extensive.
Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp. 45 is authority for
the validity of this provision. There the defendant, an Ohio manufac-
turer, sold a safety valve to a firm which, in Pennsylvania, attached it
to a waterheater which was then sold in Illinois. The plaintiff was an
Illinois resident who was injured in an explosion of the heater. The
Supreme Court of Illinois upheld jurisdiction over the Ohio defendant,
arguing as to the constitutional question that:
Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the
manufacture of products presumably sold in contemplation of use
here, it should not matter that the purchase was made from an in-
dependent middleman or that someone other than the defendant
shipped the product into this State .... [If] a corporation elects to
sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust
to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in
those products. 46
137. 355 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added).
138. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, at 252-53 (1958).
139. This was the view of the court in Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,
270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1959).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(3) (1960).
141. 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), noted in 14 MD. L. Rgv. 140 (1957).
142. Id. at 507.
143. Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957),
which cited with approval the Erlanger Mills case. Accord, Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard
Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Products Corp.,
218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961); Chassis-Trak, Inc. v. Federated Purchaser, Inc.,
179 F. Supp. 780 (D. N.J. 1960).
144. Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959).
145. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
146. 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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If jurisdiction is constitutional when someone other than the defendant
ships a product into the state, a fortiori, it is constitutional when the
defendant himself does so.
Suppose in these cases, the defendant had the merchandise de-
livered by its own agent? Jurisdiction would be justified on the basis
of an act committed within the state. Why should shipment by means
of an independent carrier change this result? In both situations the
defendant has purposefully, to obtain a profit, entered into a trans-
action having the same substantial effects within the state. It does not
seem unjust to require him to defend a claim arising from those
effects in the courts of that state.
147
It should already have been observed that the reported cases con-
cern merchandise shipped into the state. The Uniform Act asserts
jurisdiction on the basis of a claim arising from the defendant's
"contracting to supply services or things in this state". 48 Curiously,
the Maryland statute omits the important words "or things" and
applies only to "services". The thought may have been that in the
case of services, which would presumably be performed in the state by
the defendant or his agents, there is a closer contact with the state
than the shipment of merchandise into the state through a carrier.
But it is not the services which are the basis for jurisdiction, but the
"contracting to supply services". Jurisdiction for defective services
performed in the state can rest on subsection (1) or (3). Since it
is the contractual relationship which is the basis for jurisdiction, there
is no logical distinction between services and things.
Because of the omission, the Maryland resident who is injured by
defective merchandise shipped into the state by a foreign manufac-
turer or who suffers damages because of the failure of such manu-
facturer to carry out his contractual obligations may be deprived of
the opportunity of using a local forum. The only type of action which
this subsection would add to Maryland jurisdiction is one for failure
to supply promised services. The result of the failure to follow the
language of the Uniform Act in this subsection has been to cut down
the reach of the "long arm" to a fraction of its potential.
147. See Reese & Galston, Doing An Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of
Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. Rev. 246, 261-62 (1959). Decisions upholding juris-
diction on this basis are Wisconsin Metal & Chemical Corp. v. DeZurik Corp., 222 F.
Supp. 119 (E.D. Wisc. 1963); Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co., 224 F. Supp. 90(S.D. Tex. 1963) ; S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954).
In Davis v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961), jurisdiction
over a non-resident automobile owner who never entered the state was upheld on
the ground that she permitted her car to be driven into the state where the accident
occurred. While Sobeloff, J., in the Davis case distinguishes the same court's decision
in Erlanger Mills by placing the social importance of providing a remedy against
injuries from automobile accidents in a "higher order" than the Erlanger Mills
situation, the Davis case does assert jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who
was never physically in the state on the basis of a single event within the state with
which the defendant has substantial contacts.
148. In the Erlanger Mills case, Sobeloff, J., was apprehensive that allowing juris-
diction in that case would also permit jurisdiction in Pennsylvania over a California
retailer who sold defective tires in California to a Pennsylvania tourist who was
injured in Pennsylvania, 239 F.2d 502, 507. Even accepting that jurisdiction over the
California retailer in that case would be unreasonable, the requirement under the
UNIFORM Acr of an obligation of the defendant directly related to the forum state puts
that situation outside the scope of the statute.
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(3) Causing Tortious Injury In this State By An Act
Or Omission In This State
In its decision in the McGee case,'4 9 the United States Supreme
Court cited with approval the decision in Smyth v. Twin State Im-
provement Corp.150 In that case, suit was brought in Vermont against
a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the roofing business, alleging
that in re-roofing the plaintiff's house in Vermont, the defendant had
negligently caused a leak in the roof. This job was the defendant's only
activity in Vermont. The Vermont statute provided for jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation which "commits a tort in whole or in part"
in Vermont.' 5 '
In holding that jurisdiction over the defendant did not violate due
process, the Vermont Supreme Court emphasized three aspects in the
situation. First, the defendant, who came into Vermont in pursuit of
its business activities and had the protection of the laws of that state,
could not reasonably argue unfairness in having to litigate there a
claim arising out of its activities in the state. Second, to require a local
resident to sue in a foreign state on a tort committed where he lives
is unfair to him and might prevent suit altogether. Third, because of
the availability of witnesses and the applicability of its substantive law,' 52
"the court of the locus is normally the forum of convenience for the
settlement of the dispute."' 55
The same conclusion was reached by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Nelson v. Miller'4 under a statutory provision based on "the commis-
sion of a tortious act within the state". The tortious act in that case
was committed by the defendant's employee, delivering a stove by truck
from Wisconsin to Illinois, who injured the plaintiff while unloading
the stove from the truck. The court observed that while motor vehicle
accidents were more common, "[t]he rational basis of the decisions
upholding the non-resident motorist statutes is broad enough to in-
clude the cases in which the non-resident defendant causes injury
without the intervention of any particular instrumentality".
The Maryland statute, consonant with the fact situations in the
Smyth and Nelson cases, requires that both the act and the injury occur
in the state. On the other hand, the Uniform Act provides for juris-
diction over a cause of action arising from events "causing tortious
injury by an act or omission in this state". Thus, it applies when the
act or omission occurs in the state even though the injury occurs else-
where.15
6
149. 355 U.S. 220 at 223 n.2 (1957).
150. 116 Vt. 568, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
151. VT. STAT. tit. 9 ch. 72, § 1562 (1947).
152. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) ; RESTATEMZNT (SScoND),
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
153. 80 A.2d at 668.
154. 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
155. 143 N.E.2d at 679. Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 338
(1953), made clear that jurisdiction over a non-resident motorist is not based on
consent arising from the power to exclude from the state's highways but on legitimate
state interest and fairness to the defendant.
156. Commissioners' Note to Section 1.03 (a) (3) of the -UNiFORM ACT.
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From the defendant's standpoint, it should make little difference
where the injury occurs. Jurisdiction is imposed on him by cases such
as Smyth and Nelson because the defendant voluntarily engaged in
certain conduct in the state. As to which is the "forum of convenience"
from the point of view of judicial administration where the act and the
injury occur in different states, there is not much to choose between
the two. The evidence as to defendant's liability is focused on the place
of the act, which also has an interest in regulating tortious conduct and
promoting safety within its boundaries. The evidence as to damages
is most closely related to the place of injury. That place, which is
presumably where plaintiff lives, also is vitally concerned with assuring
adequate compensation. Even if the plaintiff could bring suit at the
place of injury, the Uniform Act provides him with an additional
choice of forum.
The corresponding provision of the Maryland act, however, denies
a Maryland forum to a person who is injured elsewhere, normally a
non-resident of Maryland, even where the negligent act was committed
in Maryland. However, the same non-resident could sue in Maryland
if injured in the state. Jurisdiction is made to depend on the place
where the injury occurs, which often may be entirely fortuitous.
Constitutionally, there would seem to be sufficient "minimum con-
tacts" with the state to validate jurisdiction solely on the place of the
act.15
7
Article 23, § 93(d) may be regarded as a predecessor of this sub-
section of the 1964 act in its provision for jurisdiction based on
"liability incurred for acts done within this state". The 1964 act
expands jurisdiction by including individuals as well as corporate
defendants and by including non-resident plaintiffs as well as resident
plaintiffs who are injured in the state. Where a non-resident is injured
in Maryland, local interest encompasses not only the regulation of
defendant's conduct but also the assurance of adequate compensation
for the injury in order to protect local creditors who have extended
services to the injured person. To the defendant, it can make no
difference whether the injured person is a resident or a non-resident.
Under the Maryland Non-Resident Motorist Statute,15 non-resident
motorists have been subject to Maryland jurisdiction even if the in-
jured person is also a non-resident. 15
As noted earlier,' the Johns case, in applying article 23, § 99(d)
to a tort committed in the state, emphasized that the defendant's activi-
ties there were carried on regularly and continuously within the state
and that there was more than a single isolated event. The 1964 act
provides for jurisdiction on the basis of a single tort.
157. The possibility of applying subsection (1) - "transacting any business in this
state" to obtain jurisdiction on the basis of a tortious act by the defendant in the
state should not be overlooked. See note 124 supra.
158. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66%, § 115 (1957).
159. Steele v. Dennis, 62 F. Supp. 73 (D. Md. 1945). But jurisdiction exists over
a non-resident owner or operator of aircraft or watercraft only if the injury is to the
person or property of a Maryland resident. MD. Cons ANN. art. 75, §§ 76, 77 (1957).
160. Supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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(4) Causing Tortious Injury In This State By An Act
Or Omission Outside The State
This subsection is similar to subsection (2) in that it authorizes
jurisdiction over a defendant who has not performed any act within
the state. Under Subsection (2), jurisdiction is based on the defend-
ant's undertaking and subsequent failure to make proper performance
in the state. The plaintiff's claim and the jurisdictional basis thus
arise out of the same events. Subsection (4), on the other hand, does
not require that the defendant's injury-causing conduct be directly
linked to Maryland. A manufacturer who produces an article negli-
gently outside the state will be subject to Maryland jurisdiction even
if he played no part in having the article brought into the state. The
basis for jurisdiction is that the injury took place in the state and
that the over-all relationship of the defendant with the state is a sub-
stantial one.
In Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 6 ' the plaintiff was injured in West
Virginia as a result of an explosion of a gas pipeline. He sued the
manufacturer of the pipe, a Texas corporation, which had sold the
pipe to the gas company which used it in West Virginia. The plain-
tiff's argument for West Virginia jurisdiction over the defendant
rested on an allegation that the defendant "manufactured gas pipe which
it sold throughout the country."' 62 The court found that there was
insufficient minimum contact shown between the defendant and West
Virginia to justify jurisdiction over the defendant. 6 '
In the Gray case, discussed above,16 4 the defendant sold a product
outside the state, which later found its way into Illinois where the
injury occurred. There, too, the plaintiff did not specifically indicate
what, if any, other business the defendant had conducted in Illinois.
Yet, the court found Illinois jurisdiction to exist. Its major focus
was on the question of the "convenient forum", observing that "the
trend in defining due process of law is away from the emphasis on
territorial limitations . . . toward the court in which both parties can
most conveniently settle their dispute."' 6 5 Illinois jurisdiction satisfied
this requirement since the injury took place there to a local resident,
the law of Illinois was applicable and the witnesses as to injury and
damages were in Illinois. The "minimum contacts" were present,
since it was a reasonable inference in view of the "growing inter-
dependence of business enterprises" that the defendant's product was
161. 209 F. Supp. 571, 573 (N.D. W. Va. 1962).
162. Id. at 573. There was no showing as to where the pipe was actually delivered
to the gas company.
163. In O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963), the
same result was reached on an allegation that the commodity was "placed-in the stream
of commerce." Cf. Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961).
164. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See notes 145-46 supra and accom-
panying text.
165. 176 N.E.2d at 765.
19661
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
substantially used in Illinois. The court concluded that "the use of
such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact
with this state to justify a requirement that he defend here.' 6 6
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Atkins v.
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.'67 goes further than the Gray case.
In that case, the plaintiff, a truck driver, was injured while unloading
the defendant's product in the state. In finding that it had jurisdiction
over the defendant, the court emphasized the "convenient forum" pro-
vided by jurisdiction at the place of the injury and noted the general
objective of the single act statute, which was "to permit a Minnesota
citizen injured here by the wrongful act of a foreign corporation to
seek recompense therefor in our courts.' 6 8  The court also found a
sufficient "minimum contact" between the defendant and the state with
the argument that "defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts, since the last event essential to its tort liability - the injury
of plaintiff - occurred here.' 1 69 One could defend the decision in the
Atkins case by pointing out that even if the defendant has no other
contact with a state except that of causing an injury there, as between
that defendant who is in business for gain, and an innocent plaintiff,
the defendant should travel to litigate rather than the plaintiff. One
could also place on the scales in favor of jurisdiction in the state of the
injury the interest of that state in having its resident receive com-
pensation, the presence of local witnesses, etc. Constitutionally, however,
these arguments squarely come up against the requirement of the
Hanson case that there must be a voluntary and purposeful contact
between the defendant and the forum state. 70
t It is unnecessary to pursue this inquiry any further with reference
to the Uniform Act, which is more restrictive than the Gray case. The
Uniform Act lays down certain objective requirements for jurisdiction
which show a substantial relation between the defendant and the
forum state. Instead of the inference made by the court in the Gray case,
the plaintiff would have to prove that these are satisfied in order
successfully to claim jurisdiction over the defendant.
The first requirement relates to activities within the state. The
defendant is subject to jurisdiction where an injury occurs in the
166. 176 N.E.2d at 766. Accord, Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp.,
267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963) ; Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d
305 (1963).
167. 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
168. 104 N.W.2d at 894.
169. 104 N.W.2d at 893. Accord, Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc.,
188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960).
170. See Judge Clark's analysis of the implication of the Hanson case in Deveny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963). He concludes that there is jurisdic-
tion over a non-resident tortfeasor only where he could know that his act would have
consequences in the state. Thus, where negligently manufactured equipment is sold in
state X to the plaintiff who later moves to state Y where the plaintiff is injured,
state ' will not have jurisdiction over the manufacturer. In the Atkins case, the court
could have based its decision on the contacts which existed between the defendant and
Minnesota. The merchandise was shipped by the defendant to Minnesota and there
was evidence that the defendant had sold its products there over a long period of time.
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state because of a tortious act committed outside the state if he is
regularly doing business or engaging in any other persistent course of
conduct in the state. Decisions which provide the authority for this
formulation include such patterns of conduct as direct solicitation by
sales representatives in the state,171 the sending of price lists to cus-
tomers through the mails,172 general mail advertising combined with
advertising in periodicals circulated in the state, 173 participation with
the locally franchised dealer in promoting sales,'74 and the presence in
the state of service and maintenance representatives. 7 5 The provision
is put in flexible terms, and it is certainly not necessary that the
activity amount to the "doing of business."
The second requirement concerns contact with the state rather
than activities within it. Sufficient contact exists according to the
Maryland statute if the defendant "derives substantial revenue from
food or services used or consumed in this state." A defendant who
neither makes solicitations nor engages in any other form of activity in
Maryland might still be subject to Maryland jurisdiction, even though
his negligence occurred outside the state and the injury causing item
is brought into the state by an independent distributor. There would
be jurisdiction over such a defendant if he earns substantial revenue
from the sales of his product in Maryland. What is "substantial" would
depend upon the facts of each case. 76
The Uniform Act applies to "goods used or consumed or services
rendered" in the state. The Maryland statute applies only to "food or
171. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Jenkins v. Dell
Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249
N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959); Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo.
1963). Cf. Sonnier v. Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. La. 1959).
172. Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Adamek v.
Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961); Farmer v. Ferris, 260
N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963).
173. Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 211, 325 P.2d
21 (1958).
174. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
175. Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962).
176. In Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usiness Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir.
1964), defendant was a French corporation which negligently manufactured an auto-
mobile in France causing injury in Michigan. Evidence was produced that there were
three dealers who sold the defendant's automobiles in Detroit, one of whom had gross
sales of "upwards" of $100,000. The court denied jurisdiction on the basis of the
following factors: the number and value of sales within the state, their ratio to the
total market for like or similar products within the state, the quantity or value of
the defendant's production, the percentage of total output sold within the state and
the nature of the product.
In a case against the same defendant in California with essentially the same facts,jurisdiction was found to exist, the court pointing out that an opposite result would
confine the plaintiff to the courts of France. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault v.
Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 702, 25 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1962). In Chovan v. E. I.
Dupont De Nemours & Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1963), the court held
jurisdiction to exist on the basis of the use in Michigan of the defendant's products in
1957 and 1958 to the extent of fifteen million feet of fuse of the value of approximately
$130,000. The Chovan case thus considered only the number and value of sales within
the state. Under the approach of the Velandra case, it is possible for a large manu-
facturer operating through independent distributors over a wide area to be subject to
suit only in the state of incorporation or where it has its principal place of business.
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services used or consumed" in the state. The Maryland provision
excludes all types of manufactured or processed items, other than food,
which may find their way into and cause injury in the state, either as
originally produced or as component parts of other items.
If a manufacturer derives substantial revenue from the Maryland
consumer, he is aware that his product is widely distributed in the
state. Under these circumstances, it does not seem unfair to require
him to defend the suit of a Maryland consumer in a Maryland court,
whether the injury was caused by defective food, services or any other
item. Under the provision as enacted in Maryland, if the Gray case
had been decided in a Maryland court, even if the plaintiff were able
to prove that the product, a safety valve, was substantially used in
Maryland, he could not obtain redress in its courts.
(5) Having An Interest In, Using Or Possessing
Real Property In This State.
The forerunner of this subdivision was a statute enacted in
Pennsylvania in 1937,'7 which provided that any non-resident "being
the owner, tenant, or user, of real estate" located in Pennsylvania
"shall, by the ownership, possession, occupancy, control, maintenance,
and use, of such real estate" be subject to judicial jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania as to any action arising out of any "accident or injury"
in which such real estate is involved. 178
In the early case of Dubin v. City of Philadelphia,19 the constitu-
tionality of the statute was upheld. The court asserted, on the basis of
the Hess case, that:
[I]t is just as important that non-resident owners of Phila-
delphia real estate should keep their property in such shape as not
to injure our citizens as it is that non-resident owners of cars
should drive about our streets with equal care. It is only a short
step beyond this to assert that defendants in both classes of cases
should be answerable in this forum.'
Although it has been contended that owning or possessing realty
in the state is a sufficient continuous relationship to it to justify juris-
diction over a defendant even as to a cause of action not related to the
property,' 8 1 the Maryland statute following the Pennsylvania precedent,
177. Act of July 2, 1937, P.L. 2747, § 1. PA. STAT'. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953).
178. The two clauses in the Pennsylvania statute defining the defendant's relation
to the property have caused confusion. Although the second clause was probably
intended as only illustrative of who is an "owner, tenant, or user", some Pennsylvania
cases have required the defendant to fit into at least one of the six categories of the
second clause. See Note, Ownership, Possession or Use of Property As a Basis
of In Personam Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv. 374, 379 (1959). The Maryland statute
does not have the dual requirement but contains only the equivalent of the first clause.
179. 34 Pa. D.&C. 61 (1938).
180. Id. at 64.
181. Note, Ownership, Possession or Use of Property As a Basis of In Personam
Jurisdiction, supra note 178, at 377-78.
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as also the similar Illinois and New York statutes, 8 2 limits jurisdiction
to causes of action having a connection with the property. The relation-
ship of the defendant to the property required by the statute has been
the subject of some decisions under the Pennsylvania act. The Dubin
case held that a "mortgagee in possession" who collects rents and
leases the property is a "user" of the property. A contractor who
constructs a building on another's premises was also held to be a "user"
of the real estate.18 3 A non-resident trustee who administers the
property as part of the corpus of his trust is an "owner"."' Under
the Illinois statute which requires "ownership, use or possession" of
real estate, the contention that a tenant for less than 5 years did not
meet these requirements was rejected in spite of the argument that
an interest in land for a term of years is regarded as personal property
for other purposes.' 8 5 The reference in the Maryland statute to a
defendant "having an interest" in real property is a more inclusive
requirement and provides the flexibility needed to cover these and
similar situations.
On the question of the time when the relation of the defendant
with the property should exist, it was held that a sale of property after
the cause of action arose does not defeat jurisdiction even if the sale
was completed before process was served.'8 6 On the other hand, where
an owner of land creates a hazardous condition on the land but sells
it before the damage occurs, he is not included within the statute, since
he does not have any relation to the property when the cause of action,
i.e., the damaging injury, arises. 7
The Maryland act goes beyond the Pennsylvania statute in that
the property interest is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction on any cause of
action related to the property, not only "accident or injury". A cause
of action arising out of a contract made outside of Maryland between
non-residents of Maryland would be subject to Maryland jurisdiction
if the contract concerned property in the state and the defendant had
the required interest in the property. The interest of the state where
the property is located would seem to be sufficient to justify its asser-
tion of jurisdiction.
(6) Contracting To Insure Any Person, Property Or Risk Located
Within This State At The Time Of Contracting.
This provision duplicates to a great extent the Unauthorized
Insurers Process Act enacted in Maryland in 1949."8 The Commis-
182. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 17(1) (c) (1956) ; N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND
RULES § 302(a) (3). In Shouse v. Wagner, 84 Pa. D.&C. 82, 100 P.L.J. 337 (1953),
plaintiff's automobile which was in defendant's garage was stolen and then damaged.
It was held that the cause of action did not arise out of defendant's use, ownership or
possession of the real estate.
183. Chong v. Faull, 88 Pa. D.&C. 557 (1954).
184. Jamison v. United Cigar Whelan Stores, 68 Pa. D.&C. 121 (1950).
185. Porter v. Nahas, 35 Ill. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1962).
186. Gearhart v. Pulakos, 207 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
187. Murphy v. Indovina, 384 Pa. 26, 119 A.2d 258 (1956).
188. See notes 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
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sioner's note to the Uniform Act takes the position that where a state
deals with this question as part of its overall regulatory scheme for
insurance, it may not be necessary to enact this portion of the "long
arm" statute.18 9 In observing that many states have "similar and more
explicit provisions" in their insurance laws, the note was, in all
likelihood, referring to the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act.
However, the 1964 statute, even in its brevity, has a wider sweep
than the 1949 act. The latter provides for jurisdiction over foreign
insurance companies in actions concerning policies issued to residents
of the state or to corporations authorized to do business in the
state. The former asserts jurisdiction where the policy insures any
"person, property or risk" located in the state. A policy entered into
outside the state with a non-resident of the state covering property in
the state would be included under the 1964 statute, though not under
the 1949 act.190 It is true that the 1949 act also covers "any other
transaction of insurance business" in the state. But it is doubtful that
this phrase covers an insurance contract entered into outside the state
by non-residents.
A specification of this subdivision is that the person, property or
risk insured be located in the state at the time that the policy is pro-
cured. It may be that constitutionally this limitation is not essential.
In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,' the United States Supreme Court
upheld the application of Florida law to govern an insurance policy
issued to an Illinois resident who later moved to Florida and brought
the insured property with him to Florida where the loss occurred. The
court emphasized that an insurance policy is an "ambulatory contract"
and that the interest of Florida was neither slight nor casual. Though
it was applied to a choice of law problem, the same reasoning should be
sufficient to upheld judicial jurisdiction.
The converse of the Clay situation does present a constitutional
problem under the 1964 statute. Where the plaintiff or his property is
located in Maryland at the time the policy is procured but afterwards
moves from the state, the statute would give jurisdiction to the
Maryland courts. It is doubtful that the requisite Maryland interest
still exists at this point to satisfy due process. The solution here would
lie in the application of the forum non conveniens provision of the
statute.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the "long arm" statute in 1964 was an important
step forward in assuring Maryland jurisdiction over cases having
substantial Maryland interest. The Maryland resident who has a
cause of action against a foreign individual or corporation arising out
of events occurring in Maryland is given greater access to the Mary-
189. Commissioners' note to § 1.03(a) (6) of the UNIFORM AcT.
190. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. M/V John E. Coon, 207 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.
La. 1962), which upheld the constitutionality of this type of provision.
191. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
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land courts and need not make his claim away from home. The plaintiff
who has a cause of action against a defendant whose major overall
contacts are with Maryland is provided the reasonable alternative of
suing in Maryland. Under the statute, litigation is conducted in a
forum which is convenient to the plaintiff, fair to the defendant and
promotes orderly judicial administration.
This writer believes that the Uniform Act, which, in some in-
stances, does not go as far as some states have gone, reasonably
applies contemporary jurisdictional principles and reflects the "fair play
and substantial justice" required by the International Shoe case. In
those areas where the Maryland statute is less inclusive than the
Uniform Act, the Maryland resident is being shortchanged. These,
however, comprise only a few instances in a fairly large statutory
scheme. The statute as a whole succeeds in providing the courts of
Maryland with a rational opproach to judicial jurisdiction to replace
the technicalities and fictions of the past.
